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Abstract
The student admissions and faculty recruitment problems are modeled and analyzed in terms of
graphs. Stable assignments, potentially exponential in number, form a distributive lattice whose
sup and inf are the applicant-optimal and university-optimal stable assignments, A and U .
Which one of all possible stable assignments should be chosen in practice is answered in
these terms: A is characterized as the unique choice mechanism that is either “monotone,” or
“strategy-proof,” or “e9cient.” Similar characterizations are given for U , though as a practical
matter they are not persuasive.
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1. Introduction
This paper formulates and analyzes the problem of fair student admissions, meritori-
ous faculty recruitment or “many-to-one stable matching”—in alternate interpretations,
any “two-sided” market in which =rms may employ many workers—in terms of graphs.
This generalizes the graphical approach to the special case of the stable marriage prob-
lem or “one-to-one stable matching” [5,6]. It is also an important practical instance of
the stable polyandrous polygamy problem or “many-to-many stable matching” [1] and
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the yet more general “stable allocation problem” [2] where arbitrary real numbers are
assigned instead of 0’s and 1’s.
The problem =rst appeared almost 40 years ago when Gale and Shapley [9] in-
troduced the concept of stability in the contexts of marriage and college admissions.
Stability recognizes equity or merit: if an applicant a is not assigned to a university
u, then either a is assigned to a university he or she prefers to u, or u has =lled all
of its slots with applicants it prefers to a. But there may be an exponential number of
stable assignments, so the question is: which one should be chosen.
The answer depends on the context. In two speci=c but widely representative inst-
ances—the recruitment of university faculty in France [8] and of university students in
Turkey [7]—the answer seems clear, but the practice is diQerent.
Every spring the French Ministry of National Education publishes the positions that
are to be =lled in the departments of its many universities (some 300 Professeurs
and over 1200 Ma%ˆtres de ConfCerences in 2001). Eligible candidates submit applica-
tions and for each position (or several identical positions) the university establishes a
rank preference order among the applicants it deems acceptable. Candidates are then
informed of their rankings—not ranked in one case, third in another, =rst in still an-
other, and so forth—and are asked to express their preferences among the positions
they would be willing to accept. Candidates are invited to modify their preferences
up to a =nal fatal moment, suggesting thereby the strategic importance of the choice.
The Ministry makes a stable assignment, but the system can be manipulated by candi-
dates to their advantage by concealing their true preferences (and is). Yet there exists
a unique choice of stable assignment that makes honesty the best policy for every
candidate.
In Turkey, over a million students apply to pursue university studies each year. A
candidate undergoes a series of national examinations. The results, weighted diQerently
in each discipline, determines his or her rank order in each—literature, mathematics, ar-
chitecture, history, etc.—for every university. Applicants list their preferences, e.g., 1o:
chemistry at BoTgaziUci $Universitesi, 2o: chemical engineering at BoTgaziUci $Universitesi,
etc., 6o (last): pharmacy at Ankara $Universitesi, thereby indicating that if admission
is denied by all six, he or she prefers not to attend university. The Turkish Ministry
of Education makes a stable assignment, but it is also seriously Vawed. An applicant
with improved examination scores could receive a worse assignment: “better-ranked,
worse-assigned.” Yet there exists a unique stable assignment that guarantees this can
never occur.
Elementary expositions of these results (without proofs) have been published else-
where (see [3,4]).
2. Stable assignments
An admissions (or recruitment) problem (; q) is speci=ed by a directed graph 
de=ned over a grid, and positive integers q. There are two distinct, =nite sets of agents,
U = {u1; u2; : : : ; u|U |} (the “universities”) and A= {a1; a2; : : : ; a|A|} (the “applicants”).
Each applicant a∈A has a strict preference order over those universities she or he is
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Fig. 1. Admissions graph (; q).
willing to attend, and each university u∈U has a strict ranking over those applicants
it is willing to accept and a quota qu of available places.
The nodes of the admissions graph  are the pairs (u; a), u∈U and a∈A, for which
u is acceptable to a and a to u. The fact that (u; a)∈ means that a prefers to be
accepted by u than to be unassigned; and that u prefers to accept a than to accept fewer
than qu candidates. They are located on the U × A grid where each row corresponds
to a university u∈U and each column to an applicant a∈A. The (directed) arcs of ,
or ordered pairs of nodes, are of two types: a horizontal arc {(u; ai); (u; aj)} expresses
university u’s preference for aj over ai (sometimes written aj¿uai), symmetrically a
vertical arc {(ui; a); (uj; a)} expresses applicant a’s preference for uj over ui (sometimes
written uj¿aui). The quota of university u is qu: u admits at most qu applicants. Fig. 1
gives an example of an admissions problem (; q). Arcs such as {(u1; a1); (u4; a1)}
expressing u4¿a1u1, or {(u1; a5); (u1; a9)} expressing a9¿u1a5, implied by transitivity,
are omitted. Throughout the paper arcs implied by transitivity are omitted.
It is unambiguous to refer to the successors or the predecessors of a node—or to say
a node follows another—in its row and=or column; for example, in  the successors
of (u4; a2) in its column are (u2; a2) and (u1; a2).
An assignment  in an admissions problem (; q) is a set of nodes of  at most
one per column, and at most qu in row u for each u∈U .
Suppose  is an assignment, that (u; a)∈ but (u; a) =∈ : why? To be fair  should
then either assign a to a university u′ he or she prefers or assign qu applicants to u
all higher than a on u’s list. Otherwise, (u; a) blocks  :  assigns to u a lower placed
candidate b, b¡ua (or u’s quota is not =lled), and a to a less desired university v,
v¡au (or to no university at all), so both a and u would be better-oQ by replacing b
(if necessary) by a.
Accordingly, an assignment  is stable if it admits no blocking pair (u; a), or, what
is the same thing, if the condition of Fig. 2 is veri=ed for every (u; a)∈. The black
circles represent nodes in the assignment , and the white circles a same node not in
the assignment . The de=nition says that either (u; a) is in  (left graph), or  assigns
applicant a to a university she=he prefers to u (middle) or  assigns to university u
its full quota qu of applicants all preferred to a (right). In short, an assignment  in
(; q) is stable if each node not in  either has qu successors in its row that are in 
or a successor in its column that is in .
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Fig. 2. Stability.
Fig. 3. University-domination.
Fig. 4. Applicant-domination.
Let Bv be the set of the qv “best” nodes of row v in  (or all nodes if there are
fewer). Suppose a node (v; a) of Bv has a predecessor (u; a) in its column (see Fig. 3).
Then it is obvious that (u; a) can belong to no stable assignment: a is guaranteed to
be assigned to v (or better) since she=he is among the qv =rst choices of v. (u; a) is
said to be university-dominated.
Let B∗u be the set of nodes in row u that are best in their columns and suppose (u; a)
precedes qu nodes of B∗u (see Fig. 4). Then it is obvious that (u; a) can belong to no
stable assignment: a can never be admitted by u since there are qu other applicants
each of whose =rst choice is u and each of whom is preferred by u to a. (u; a) is said
to be applicant-dominated.
Two admissions problems are said to be equivalent if they admit precisely the same
set of stable assignments.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (u; a) is either university- or applicant-dominated in (; q).
Then the admissions problem (′; q) obtained by deleting (u; a) and its adjacent arcs
is equivalent to (; q).
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Fig. 5. The domination free equivalent problem (∗; q).
Proof. Suppose  is a stable assignment in (; q). Then each node (i; j) of  is either
in  or followed by a node of  in its column or by qi nodes of  in its row. This
condition obviously carries over to  in ′ since, as was noted above, (u; a) cannot
belong to .
Suppose, then, that ′ is a stable assignment in (′; q). Then each node (i; j) of ′
is either in ′ or followed by a node of ′ in its column or by qi nodes of ′ in its
row, and this property clearly holds for all nodes of  other than the deleted node
(u; a). But it also holds for (u; a) as is easily seen by inspecting Figs. 3 and 4.
Lemma 2. (a) If (; q) contains no applicant-domination then the set of nodes A
that assigns each applicant a∈A to his or her ?rst choice is a stable assignment; and
(b) if (; q) contains no university-domination then the set of nodes U that assigns
to each university u∈U its ?rst qu choices, or all of its choices if there are fewer
than qu nodes in its row, is a stable assignment.
Proof. A assigns at most one node per column; and at most qu per row, else there
would be an applicant-domination. Similarly, U assigns at most qu nodes per row;
and at most one per column, else there would be a university-domination. So, they are
both assignments. It is obvious that each is stable.
An admissions problem (; q) with no domination is domination-free. The domina-
tion-free equivalent of (; q) is (∗; q), given in Fig. 5.
Express a stable assignment  as a vector of vectors, with the ith subvector con-
taining the names (or, rather, their numbers) of the applicants assigned to the ith
university. Then U =((9); (4; 7; 8); (5; 6); (1; 2); (3)) is the set of gray nodes in Fig. 5
and A=((8); (2; 6; 9); (3; 7); (4; 5); (1)) is the set of black nodes.
It is straightforward to verify.
Lemma 3. The domination-free equivalent (∗; q) of an admissions problem (; q) is
unique.
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately yield existence [9].
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Theorem 1. Stable assignments exist in all admissions problems.
Proof. The reduction algorithm: Given any admissions problem (; q): eliminate any
dominated node (u; a) to obtain an equivalent admissions problem (′; q). Repeat until
no further deletion is possible.
It is obvious that the algorithm terminates: each step eliminates one node, so |A||U |
is an upper bound on the total number of steps.
3. The structure of stable assignments
It is now evident that A is the optimal stable assignment for the applicants in
(∗; q), and so in (; q): there exists no stable assignment in which any applicant
is better-oQ. Symmetrically, U is the optimal stable assignment for the universities:
there exists no stable assignment in which any university is better-oQ.
But how are any two stable assignments to be compared by any one applicant or
any one university?
Let the -class (u) of university u∈U be the set of applicants assigned by  to
u, and (a) be the university assigned by  to a∈A.
An applicant a∈A has no di9culty in choosing between (a) and ′(a). But how is
a university u∈U to compare two classes (u) and ′(u)? They could be of diQerent
cardinalities; or, perhaps, of the same cardinality, but (u) could be the best 10% and
the worst 10% of u’s acceptable applicants, whereas ′(u) is the “middle” 20% of those
applicants. It would appear that a more elaborate description of preferences is necessary.
But this is not so: the data in hand su9ces. The facts are that |(u)|= |′(u)| for any
two stable assignments ; ′, and the hypothetical confrontations of choice between
classes raised in the example can never occur.
Formally, if  and ′ are stable assignments

def
¡a 
′ if u = (a)¿a ′(a)= u′
and

def
¡u 
′ if (u; a) ∈ ′\ implies (u; b) =∈  for b¡ua:
In words, every applicant in (u) is preferred to any applicant in ′(u) \ (u). Notice
that the de=nition for u∈U agrees with that for a∈A when qu=1. For u∈U , let
 u ′ mean ¡u′ and (u) = ′(u), and similarly for a∈A.
Lemma 4. Suppose  and ′ are stable assignments, (v; c)∈ ′\, and either (v; b)∈ 
for some b ¡v c or |(v)|¡ qv. De?ne the subsets R⊂U and C ⊂A recursively by:
c∈C,
a ∈ C and (u; a) ∈ \′ implies u ∈ R;
u ∈ R and (u; a) ∈ ′\ implies a ∈ C:
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Then v∈R,  and ′ both assign some university to each applicant c∈C and qu
applicants to each university u∈R. Moreover, ′ u  for u∈R and  a ′ for
a∈C.
Proof. If u is assigned to R because a∈C and (u; a)∈ \′, call (u; a) a row-pivot;
and if a is assigned to C because u∈R and (u; a)∈ ′\, call (u; a) a column-pivot
(and call (v; c) a column-pivot as well).
The recursive de=nition implies that if (u; a)∈ ′\ is a column-pivot, then it is
preceded in its row by a row-pivot (u; a′)∈ \′ (or in the case of (v; c)∈ ′\ it is
preceded in its row by a node of  or the row v is not saturated): the stability of 
then implies that (u; a) is followed in its column by a node of  (whence of \′)
so that no predecessor of (u; a) in its column can belong to . Thus, a∈C implies
column a contains one node of ′\ followed by one node of \′.
Similarly, if (u; a)∈ \′ is a row-pivot then it is preceded in its column by a
column-pivot (u′; a)∈ ′\: the stability of ′ then implies that (u; a) is followed in
its row by (all) qu nodes of ′ (at least one of which does not belong to ), so no
predecessor of (u; a) in its row can belong to ′. But to each node (u; a)∈ ′\ for
u∈R there corresponds a diQerent node (u′; a)∈ \′, and a∈C, so u′ ∈R. Thus, R
contains in total at least as many nodes of \′ as nodes of ′\. Since a row u∈R
contains qu nodes of ′, this implies each row u∈R must also contain qu nodes of .
In particular, v∈R, else R would contain more nodes of \′ than of ′\.
It is obvious that  a ′ for a∈C.
To see that ′ u ; u∈R, suppose not: for some u∗ ∈R, (u∗; a)∈ \′ is preceded in
its row by a node of ′ hence also by the row-pivot (u∗; a∗)∈ \′. Taking u∗ for v the
hypotheses of the lemma are satis=ed with the roles of  and ′ interchanged. Calling
the corresponding recursively de=ned sets R′; C′, u∗ ∈R′ (as was shown), implying
there exists a row-pivot (u∗; b∗)∈ ′\ that is necessarily preceded by (u∗; a∗) in its
row (since u∗ ∈R), so (u∗; b∗) blocks , a contradiction.
Corollary 1. If a∈A is assigned in one stable assignment then a is assigned in all
stable assignments. Similarly, if u∈U is assigned [qu applicants in one stable assign-
ment then it is assigned [qu applicants in all stable assignments; moreover, if [qu ¡ qu
then the set of applicants is always the same.
Theorem 2. If  and ′ are stable assignments then either
 u ′ or = u′ or  ≺u ′:
Proof. Suppose  =u ′, and let (u; b) be the =rst node in row u where  and ′ diQer,
say (u; b)∈ \′. By Corollary 1 there must exist (u; a)∈ ′\, so the hypothesis of
Lemma 4 holds for v= u, implying ′ u .
Let l((u)) be the least preferred applicant of university u’s -class (for an example,
see the set of all stable assignments in Fig. 7).
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Fig. 6.
Theorem 3. If  and ′ are stable assignments of (; q) then  u ′ if and only if
l((u))¿ul(′(u)).
Proof. No two diQerent classes of u have the same least preferred applicant.
Thus, the “natural” preference of a university u∈U is to make the least preferred
accepted applicant the best possible.
The “opposition of interests” between agents of U and agents of A is immediate
from Lemma 4.
Theorem 4. If  and ′ are stable assignments then ′ u  for u∈U if and only if
 a ′ for every a∈A with (u; a)∈ (\′)∪ (′\).
If  and ′ are stable assignments of some admissions problem, their supremum
∨ ′ assigns to each u the best of the two classes (u) and ′(u); and their in?mum
 ∧ ′ assigns to each u the worst of the two classes (u) and ′(u).
Lemma 5. If  and ′ are stable assignments, then their supremum ∨′ and in?mum
 ∧ ′ are stable assignments as well.
Proof. The two cases are similar, so consider  ∨ ′.  ∨ ′ satis=es each university’s
quota by de=nition. To see that it is an assignment, it must be veri=ed that each
applicant is assigned at most once. Let shaded circles represent , black circles ′ and
encompassing white squares  ∨ ′. Suppose that there were two nodes in a column
of  ∨ ′. Then the picture on the left of Fig. 6 obtains, implying the picture in the
middle. But (v; a)∈ ′ must have at least one predecessor (v; b)∈  in its row as shown
in the picture on the right: this contradicts the stability of .
Thus,  ∨ ′ is an assignment. Were it not stable, a similar argument would show
either  or ′ is not stable.
Notice that if  and ′ are stable assignments then assigning to each u the best qu
applicants among the union of the applicants assigned to u by  and by ′ is also
the stable assignment  ∨ ′; but assigning to each u the worst qu applicants among
the union of the applicants assigned to u by  and by ′ is not in general a stable
assignment.
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Fig. 7. The lattice L().
There are two opposite natural partial orders over the stable assignments de=ned as
follows: if  and ′ are stable assignments,

def
¡A 
′ if ¡a
′ for all a ∈ A
and

def
¡U 
′ if ¡u
′ for all u ∈ U;

defU ′ if ¡U′ and  = ′, and A is de=ned similarly.
A lattice is a =nite, partially ordered set L having the property that every pair of its
elements x and y has a supremum or least upper bound, written x∨y, and an in=mum
or greatest lower bound, written x ∧ y. A lattice is distributive if every three of its
elements, x, y and z, satisfy x∨(y∧z)= (x∨y)∧(x∨z) and x∧(y∨z)= (x∧y)∨(x∧z).
It is easy to verify [11];
Theorem 5. The set of stable assignments of an admissions problem (; q), with the
partial order ¡U (or with ¡A), is a distributive lattice L(; q).
Instead of de=ning the supremum and in=mum with respect to the preferences of the
universities one could do so with respect to the applicants: but it comes to the same
thing, as is easily veri=ed using Lemma 4 or Theorem 4.
Lemma 6. If  and ′ are stable assignments then  ∨ ′ (respectively,  ∧ ′) is
the stable assignment that assigns each applicant to the university she=he likes least
(respectively, likes best) among the at most two universities to whom she=he are
assigned in  and ′.
In short, the lattice with ¡A is the same as that with ¡U except that the order is
reversed. The lattice of the example is given in Fig. 7 (with the order ¡A).
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There are eight stable assignments in all. They are
U = ((9); (4; 7; 8); (5; 6); (1; 2); (3)); 1 = ((9); (4; 7; 8); (5; 6); (2; 3); (1));
2 = ((8); (4; 7; 9); (5; 6); (1; 2); (3)); 3 = ((8); (6; 7; 9); (4; 5); (1; 2); (3));
4 = ((8); (4; 7; 9); (5; 6); (2; 3); (1)); 5 = ((8); (6; 7; 9); (4; 5); (2; 3); (1));
6 = ((8); (6; 7; 9); (3; 5); (2; 4); (1)); A=((8); (2; 6; 9); (3; 7); (4; 5); (1)):
The least preferred applicant of each university (when it has more than one applicant)
is indicated by the bold number. University u2, for example, has four diQerent classes,
each class characterized by its least preferred applicant.
4. Why A should be chosen
It is amusing to observe that the French and Turkish Ministries of Education both
choose U , the optimal stable assignment for universities, the =rst for recruiting faculty,
the second for admitting students. Is there a natural proclivity for bureaucracies to favor
institutions over individuals? Whatever the reason, the choice is a bad one.
The question is: which of the potentially exponential many stable assignments should
be chosen ?
An assignment mechanism  is a function that for any admissions problem (; q)
selects exactly one stable assignment. Two obvious examples are the applicant-optimal
mechanism that always selects A and the university-optimal mechanism that always
selects U (in “violation” of proper notation they will be referred to as the mechanisms
A and U , respectively).
Three characterizations each separately justify the use of the applicant-optimal mech-
anism A. The idea of “e9ciency” is presented =rst not because of its importance, but
rather because some of the results are prerequisites to establishing the other two char-
acterizations.
4.1. E@ciency
The “e9ciency” of a solution is a key notion in economics. If  and ′ are assign-
ments (stable or not)

def
¡A 
′ if ¡aA for all a ∈ A
and 
defA ′ if ¡A′ and  = ′. Here one would wish to assert that there exists no
assignment , stable or not, with  A A. But this is not true as may be seen in
Fig. 8: A is the set of black circles and  the set of squares.
However, in fact, A is almost e9cient. To see this a preliminary lemma is useful.
Lemma 7. Let  be a stable assignment. Suppose every university that is assigned
an applicant is preferred by at least one assigned applicant to his assignment in .
Then there exists a stable assignment ′ with ′ A .
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Fig. 8.  ¿A A.
Fig. 9.  black circles,  gray circles.
Proof. Given , choose in the row of each university u that is assigned an applicant,
the node (u; a) that corresponds to the applicant a that u prefers among all those
applicants who prefer u to their assignment in . Call this set  (see Fig. 9).
The set of nodes ∪  contains a cycle C of nodes alternating between nodes of
 and nodes of . To see this, consider the bipartite graph whose nodes are U ′ ∪A′,
where U ′ is the subset of universities U assigned at least one applicant by , A′ is the
set of assigned applicants, with edges (u; a) whenever (u; a)∈ ∪ . Suppose  assigns
[qu applicants to u for each u∈U ′. Then each node u∈U ′ has exactly [qu + 1 adjacent
edges, so the graph has |U ′| +∑U ′ [qu edges in all. But this is precisely the number
of nodes in the graph |U ′ ∪A′|, and so shows the graph must contain a cycle.
In C every node (u; a) of  is preceded in its column by a node of  (by de=nition)
and succeeded in its row by qu nodes of  (by the stability of ).
De=ne ′ to be  except for the nodes within C, where those of  are taken instead
of those of :
(u; a) ∈ ′ if either (u; a) ∈  ∩ C or (u; a) ∈ \C:
′ is clearly an assignment, ′ A . To see that it is stable, suppose some node
(u; a) =∈ ′ is not followed in its row by qu nodes of ′. If row u has fewer than qu
nodes of ′, then it also has fewer than qu nodes of , so (u; a) must be followed
in its column by a node (v; a) of  (by the stability of ). If (v; a) =∈ ′ it must by
construction be followed in its column by a node of ′.
Otherwise, (u; a) has qu nodes of ′ in its row but is followed by fewer of them. So
it must be preceded by at least one node (u; b) of ′ and either (u; b)∈  or (u; b)∈ .
In the =rst case (u; a) must be followed in its column by a node of  (by the stability
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of ) and so by a node of ′ (by construction); in the second case, (v; a)∈  for some
v, but (v; a) must follow (u; a) (by the de=nition of ).
A very slightly less ambitious concept of e9ciency holds. ∗ is e@cient for appli-
cants or A-e@cient if there is no assignment , stable or not, satisfying
¡A
∗ and for every u ∈ U there exists a ∈ ∗(u) with  a ∗:
Strict preference is invoked for at least one applicant of every ∗(u) class. A mechanism
is A-e@cient if it always selects an A-e9cient stable assignment.
Theorem 6. A is the unique A-e@cient mechanism.
Proof. It is obvious that A is the only possible such mechanism.
Suppose the theorem were false: there exists ¡AA with  a A for at least one
a∈ A(u) for every u∈U , so in particular, if a is assigned to a university by A it
must also be assigned to a university by , and ||¿|A|.
Suppose that some row u∈U contained more nodes in  than in A. Then there
exists a node (u; a)∈ \A. Since ¡aA, the node (u; a) cannot be followed in its
column by a node of A, and so (by the stability of A) it must be followed in its row
by qu nodes of A. But, then,  contains more than qu nodes in row u, a contradiction.
Therefore, each row and each column contains the same number of nodes of  and of
A, and ||= |A|.
By hypothesis, every row u∈U contains at least one node in A\, so it must be
that every row contains at least one node in \A: that is, every university u∈U
is preferred by at least one assigned candidate to his or her assignment in A. The
condition of Lemma 7 is met, implying the existence of a stable assignment ′ A A,
a contradiction.
This generalizes the following result known for marriage problems [10].
Corollary 2. There exists no assignment  (stable or not) with  a A for every
a∈A.
In fact, Theorem 6 applied to the special case of marriage problems—when qu=1
for all u∈U—is stronger. It says that there exists no assignment  (stable or not) with
 a A for all a∈A that are assigned to some university in A. The applicants that
are not assigned do not enter the picture.
Theorem 6 cannot be strengthened in that there may exist assignments with  A A
when (u)= A(u) for at least one u∈U . However, if one imagines relatively large A-
classes it would seem that such situations are relatively rare. One approach to evaluating
this intuition would be to count the number of assignments better than A in the sense
of the theorem as a percentage of all those assignments that are weakly better than A:
an answer close to 100% would comfort this point of view. The computation, however,
appears to be di9cult.
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4.2. A blocking theorem
The next theorem—known in the case of marriages [10]—is the key to the proofs
of the two characterizations that follow [7] (=rst proven via appeal to other published
results whose proofs are doubtful or incomplete). The fact that the same key opens
both doors shows that the properties of “monotonicity” and “strategy-proofness” are
two aspects of a common phenomenon.
Theorem 7. If  is an assignment strictly preferred to A by each of the applicants
a∈A′ ⊂ A but not by a =∈A′, then some (u; a) with a =∈A′ blocks .
Proof. To begin observe that A′ must be a proper subset of A by Corollary 2. There
are two possibilities to consider: either (i) |A(u)∩A′|= |(u)∩A′|= [qu for all u∈U ,
or (ii) not.
(i) Let U ′ be the subset of those nodes for which [qu¿1.
Eliminate every node (u; a) of , a∈A′, for which u¿a(a), to obtain the graph
[ and note that ( [; q) is equivalent to (; q). Now consider its subgraph [
′
de=ned
on U ′ × A′. It de=nes an admissions problem with quotas [qu. The restriction ′A of A
to ( [
′
; [qu) is a stable assignment in ( [
′
; [qu); and the restriction 
′ of  to [
′
is the
applicant-optimal stable assignment in ( [
′
; [qu).
Take the graph [ and reduce it as much as possible except that nodes (u; a)∈U ′×A′
are eliminated only by applicant-best dominations of the following restricted type: the
set B∗u of the qu applicant-best nodes must contain at least [qu nodes (u; a) with a∈A′.
Call the resulting reduced graph [
∗
. It must contain every node of ′. This is true
because every reduction that was made is also valid for the problem ( [
′
; [qu), and it is
known that ′ is its applicant-optimal stable assignment.
However, [
∗
is not fully reduced since it contains the nodes ′, whereas it is
known that A is its applicant-optimal stable assignment. Therefore, [
∗
must contain an
applicant-best domination B∗u whose qu nodes contain fewer than [qu nodes (u; a) with
a∈A′, where some (u; b) is the node to be eliminated. This implies that B∗u contains
more than qu − [qu nodes (u; a) with a =∈A′, and so at least one node (u; a) =∈ A with
a =∈A′. This means—by the de=nition of A′—that either  assigns a to no university
or ((a); a) precedes (u; a) in its column.
Indeed, (u; a) blocks  in [ and so in , because it must be preceded in its row
by some node of . To see this, suppose the contrary. Then every node of  in row u
must follow (u; a). Either none of these nodes of  have been eliminated in [
∗
or at
least one has been eliminated. In the =rst case, they are all applicant-best nodes, there
are [qu of them and all belong to A
′, so there exists a domination of restricted type, a
contradiction. In the second case, a node of  has been eliminated by a domination of
restricted type that follows (u; a), so in fact (u; a) should have been eliminated too by
the same domination. This proves the result in case (i).
(ii) Suppose that some row contains more nodes of A(A′) than of (A′). Then since
the number of nodes of (A′) is no smaller than those of A(A′), some other row u
must contain more nodes of (A′) than of A(A′). In row u, each node of (A′) must
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Fig. 10. (; q) and (′; q): U not A-monotone.
be followed by qu nodes of A (since each node of (A′) is preceded in its column by
a node of A or has no node of A). But, then, there must exist a node (u; a)∈ A\
with a =∈A′. (u; a) blocks  since by the de=nition of A′ either there is no node of 
in column a or there is and it must precede (u; a).
4.3. Monotonicity
Suppose that the rank of a student b in Turkey, or of a prospective faculty member
b in France, improves at one or several universities—say because b’s exam scores
were, in fact, better than =rst reported, or because b has just published an outstand-
ing new result. Then, surely, the only acceptable consequence of this change in data
is that b obtains the same or a preferable assignment. Formally, given an admissions
problem (; q), the problem (b; q) is an improvement for applicant b∈A if b is
identical to  except that b may be improved in the rankings of one or several uni-
versities: an assignment mechanism  is monotone for applicants or A-monotone if
(b; q)¡b(; q) for all improvements for b.
Regrettably, the university-optimal mechanism U used in France and Turkey is not
A-monotone. Fig. 10 is an example—devised by JosCe Rafael Correa—that shows mono-
tonicity may be violated. (; q) is the admissions problem in which a1 is university
u1’s least preferred applicant, (′; q) the problem that is exactly the same except that
a1 becomes u1’s most preferred applicant and so is improved for a1. The university-
optimal stable assignment of (; q) is the set of black circles, that of (′; q) the set of
white squares. In (; q) applicant a1 is given her =rst choice, but in (′; q) she gets
her last choice!
However, A is A-monotone; indeed, it is the only such mechanism.
Lemma 8. The mechanism A is A-monotone.
Proof. Suppose (b; q) is an improved problem for b over (; q), with bA and A
their respective applicant-optimal stable assignments. Suppose the lemma were false:
A b bA. Let A′= {a∈A : A a bA} = ∅. A′ must be a proper subset of A, by
Corollary 2 applied to b. Theorem 7 says that A must be blocked in b by a pair
(u; a); a =∈A′. But since b∈A′ is the only applicant whose position has changed and it
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advanced in going from  to b, all predecessors of (u; a) in b are also predecessors
of (u; a) in . Therefore, (u; a) must block A in  too, a contradiction.
Theorem 8. A is the unique A-monotone mechanism.
Proof. Suppose  is any A-monotone mechanism but that it is not the applicant-optimal
mechanism,  = A. Then there must exist a problem (; q) with (; q) = A(; q),
say (b) = A(b)= u, so with (b) ¡b u.
Consider (−b; q), identical to (; q) except that applicant b becomes the least ac-
ceptable candidate on every university’s preference list save university u’s list, which
remains unchanged. (; q) is an improved problem for b over (−b; q), if  =−b.
A is clearly stable in −b. Suppose  is any stable assignment in −b then it must
be that u′= (b)¿bu. In fact, b is assigned in A so it must be assigned in  too. If
u′ = u then, A u′  in −b. By the opposition of interests between the agents U and
the agents A (Theorem 4), it follows that  b A.
Let (−b) def= −b. Since −b is stable, −b(b)¿bu, but (b) ¡b u. This contra-
dicts the A-monotonicity of  if  =−b; otherwise it contradicts the fact that  yields
a unique assignment.
4.4. Strategy-proofness
Admissions problems are games: the players—the applicants and the universities—
have their preferences, but when it comes to revealing them to some agency to de-
termine an assignment, a player may well be tempted to announce a diQerent pref-
erence order in the hopes of obtaining a better outcome. An assignment mechanism
is said to be “strategy-proof” if no player or cabal of players can ever bene=t by
stating preferences other than their true preferences. It is well known and easy to
establish that no mechanism exists for which honesty is always the best policy for
all players. However, in the context of Turkish admissions the rankings of the ap-
plicants are by law determined on the basis of examination scores. And in France
all universities must by a certain time have communicated their rankings to the Min-
istry. Accordingly, in both situations the only strategic players that remain are the
applicants.
Formally, suppose (; q) represents the true preferences of all the players and that
(′; q) does also, except for a subset of the applicants A′ who announce altered pref-
erences. The mechanism  is said to be strategy-proof for applicants or A-strategy
proof if (′; q) a (; q) for all a∈A′ is false, for every choice of A′ ⊂ A. A mech-
anism is strategy-proof in this de=nition if no subset of the applicants can improve their
assignments by stating false preferences.
Regrettably, the university-optimal mechanism U used in France and Turkey is not
A-strategy-proof. Imagine the example of Fig. 1 to be a case of French recruitment.
U assigns applicant a9 to his second choice university u1, and a8 to his second choice
u2. But if a9 lies by saying he prefers no job to a job at u1 (or if a8 lies by saying
he prefers no job to a job at u2) then the university-optimal mechanism assigns a9 to
u2 and a8 to u1: both are assigned their =rst choices.
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Lemma 9. The mechanism A is A-strategy-proof.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a stable matching ′ in (′; q), preferred by the ap-
plicants A′ to A. Let [A be the set of all applicants that prefer ′ to A. By Corollary
2, [A =A, and by Theorem 7 there must exist some (u; a) with a =∈ [A that blocks ′ in
. But the preferences of this u and this a are exactly the same in  and ′, so (u; a)
blocks ′ in ′ too, a contradiction.
Theorem 9. A is the unique A-strategy-proof mechanism.
Proof. Suppose  is any A-strategy-proof mechanism but that it is not the applicant-
optimal mechanism,  = A. Then there must exist a problem (; q) with (; q) =
A(; q), say, (b) = A(b)= u, so with (b) ¡b u. For ease of notation take A def=
A(; q) and 
def= (; q).
Let A′= {a∈A : A a } and consider (′; q) de=ned to be the same as (; q)
except that each applicant a∈A′ excludes every university u for which u¡aA(a),
that is, all nodes (u; a)∈ are excluded that precede (A(a); a) in its
column.
A is clearly a stable assignment in (′; q), so in every stable assignment ′ of (′; q)
every applicant assigned to a university in A is also assigned to a university in ′.
But for a∈A′; ′(a)¿aA(a) by the de=nition of ′. Thus, for every stable assignment
′ of (′; q): ′(a)¿a(a) for a∈A′. But this means that whatever ′ is selected by
the mechanism , it yields a strict improvement for all a∈A′, contradicting the fact
that  is strategy-proof.
4.5. Practical implications
The evidence is conclusive: in France and in Turkey—and in untold similar circums-
tances—the applicant-optimal mechanism A should be used. Each of three diQerent
compelling qualitative properties uniquely determine A.
It is surely unacceptable to use a mechanism that may give a student applicant a
worse assignment when his exam scores improve; or that may give a prospective pro-
fessor a less interesting job when he becomes more desirable. Monotonicity is essential.
It is also surely unacceptable for a public authority to use a mechanism that al-
lows job seekers, or several of them, to intrigue and improve their lots. But avoiding
this theoretical possibility is important in the Turkish context too, despite the fact that
no applicant or group of applicants could possibly have the information necessary to
intrigue successfully. Today, as several ex-applicants have testi=ed, strategic consid-
erations play an important role. The hearsay of past years induces applicants to alter
their true preferences, giving higher priorities to less desirable universities, in the quest
of assuring admission somewhere. But such stratagems may seriously bias the result,
penalizing applicants who undervalue themselves as versus those who do not. Using
A would permit informing all applicants that their optimal personal strategy is always
to reveal their true preferences, thus eliminating arbitrary self-censorship and other
potential hazards.
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Fig. 11.  squares, U black circles,  ¿U U .
Fig. 12. U (black circles) ine9cient.
E9ciency is of course an added bonus: but does it not make good sense to optimize
for individuals rather than for institutions?
5. What about U ?
5.1. E@ciency
It has generally been accepted that there is an essential asymmetry between applicants
and universities, that the “oneness” of applicants is distinctive.
This belief has its origin in the paper of Roth [12] where an example shows that
when the universities have “responsive” preferences there may exist an assignment 
“strictly preferred” by the universities to the university-optimal assignment U . Fig. 11
gives a simple example:  (the squares) is “better than” U (the black circles) for
every university according to responsive preferences.
The fact is that to each characterization of A in the last section there is a similar
characterization of U : the problem is symmetric. It su9ces to replace “responsive”
preferences by generalizing the preferences that naturally suggest themselves when
comparing any two stable assignments (recall the de=nition of ¡u and Theorem 2).
Although interesting mathematically, these characterizations are less compelling as a
practical matter.
The di9culty in seeing the symmetry resides in how to compare two diQerent assign-
ments (u) = ′(u). Consider a problem where the quotas are generous in comparison
with the number of applicants, as in Fig. 12.
The university-optimal assignment U of Fig. 12 is viciously “university-ine9cient”:
every assignment, stable or not, that gives three students to u1 and three to u2 is
“better” for the universities. When the U -class of u is less than its quota, U (u)¡qu,
university u is in eQect not “competitive,” and it is not reasonable to imagine it being
assigned better classes. Moreover, in this case, every stable assignment gives to u
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exactly the same set of applicants, U (u). In a word, the comparisons of interest only
concern universities whose quotas are =lled.
Accordingly, extend the de=nition of university preferences to arbitrary assignments
(stable or not), as follows:

def
¡u 
′ if  =u ′ or qu = |(u)|¿ |′(u)| and l((u))¿ul(′(u))
and

def
¡U 
′ if ¡u
′ for all u ∈ U;
with  U ′ if ¡U′ and  = ′. The de=nition implies that two assignments  and
′ that give to a university u strictly less than qu are not comparable. Note that when
qu=1 the de=nition coincides with that of the preferences of applicants.
With this de=nition, the results concerning applicants have counterparts for uni-
versities. When  is a stable assignment let U ∗ = {u∈U : |(u)|= qu} be the set of
universities whose quotas are =lled.
Lemma 10. Let  be a stable assignment and l((u))= au be the least preferred
applicant in  for each u∈U ∗ . If every au∗ ; u∗ ∈U ∗ , is preferred by another univer-
sity u∈U ∗ to some applicant of (u), then there exists a stable assignment ′ with
′ U .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 7. Let [= {au : u∈U ∗ }. For each au
let (v; au) be the node where v is au’s preferred university among all those in U ∗ that
prefer au to some applicant assigned it by ; call this set of nodes . By the stability
of  every node of  is followed in its column by a node of [; by construction, every
node of  is preceded in its row by a node of [. Since ||= | [| there must exist a
directed cycle C among the nodes of [∪ .
De=ne ′ to be  except for the nodes within C, where those of  are taken instead
of those of :
(u; a)∈ ′ if (u; a) ∈  ∩ C or (u; a) ∈ \C:
′ is clearly an assignment, ′ U . It is also stable. For suppose (u; a) =∈ ′. If column
a contains no node of  then (u; a) must be followed in its row by qu nodes of  (by
the stability of ) and therefore by qu nodes of ′ (by the de=nition of the cycle C).
If column a contains a node of  then by the de=nition of  the node (u; a) is either
followed in its column by a node of ′ or followed in its row by qu nodes of  and
so of ′ as well: so ′ is stable.
∗ is e@cient for universities or U-e@cient if there exists no assignment , stable
or not, satisfying
¡U
∗ and  u ∗ for all u ∈ U ∗ = {u ∈ U : |(u)| = qu}:
A mechanism is U-e@cient if it always selects a U -e9cient stable assignment.
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Theorem 10. U is the unique U-e@cient mechanism.
Proof. Clearly, U is the only possible U -e9cient mechanism.
Suppose the theorem were false: there exists an assignment ¡UU with  u U
for all u∈U ∗, so in particular, ||¿|U |.
If column a∈A contains a node (u; a)∈ \U then it must be followed in its column
by a node of U\. For otherwise, the stability of U implies (u; a) is followed in its
row by qu nodes of U , contradicting the hypothesis  u U ; u∈U ∗.
Let au be the least preferred applicant in U for each u∈U ∗. By de=nition  u
U implies (u; au)∈ U\. Column au must contain a node (v; au)∈ \U , else some
column would have to contain a node of \U but no node of U\ (since ||¿|U |).
Therefore, as seen in the last paragraph, (v; au) precedes (u; au) in column au. But
¡vU and  =v U implies some node of U precedes (v; au) in row v. Thus, the
condition of Lemma 10 is satis=ed, implying there exists a stable assignment ′ U
U , a contradiction.
Thus, U is e9cient or Pareto optimal in the sense that there is no assignment 
that gives to every university whose quota is =lled a class that it strictly prefers. The
conclusion is symmetric with that concerning A.
5.2. A blocking theorem
Theorem 11. If  is an assignment strictly preferred to U by each of the universities
u∈U ′⊂U , but not by u =∈U ′, then some (u; a) with u =∈U ′ blocks .
Proof. To begin, note that by Lemma 1—speci=cally, the equivalence of problems
when university-dominated nodes are eliminated—it may be supposed that (; q) has
the following two properties: (i) if u∈U ′, then there are no nodes in row u that
succeed (u; l(U (u))) other than nodes of ∪ U ; and (ii) if u∈U ′ and |U (u)|¡ qu
then all nodes in row u are in ∪ U .
Any node (u; a)∈ \U for u∈U ′ must be preceded in its row by some node of
U\. The stability of U then implies that (u; a) is succeeded in its column by a node
(v; a)∈ U\. If v =∈U ′ then (v; a) blocks , as was to be shown. So, assume v∈U ′
in every such case. This leads to a contradiction.
For let (U ′ ; qU ′) be the restriction of (; q) to nodes (u; a); u∈U ′, with U ′ its
university-optimal assignment. The restriction of U is clearly stable in (U ′ ; qU ′), so
Theorem 10 implies it must diQer from U ′ .
Use university-dominations to reduce (; q): at some step of the reduction a node
(u; a)∈ \U must be eliminated by a university-domination Bv; v =∈U ′, and (v; a)
blocks  (otherwise ′U is the restriction of U to (U ′ ; qU ′)).
5.3. Monotonicity
Given (; q) the problem (v; q) is an improvement for university v∈U if v
is identical to  except that v may be improved in the rankings of one or several
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applicants. A mechanism  is U-monotone if (v; q)¡v(; q) for all improvements
for v.
Lemma 11. The mechanism U is U-monotone.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 8. Symmetric arguments use Theorems
10 and 11 (instead of Corollary 2 and Theorem 7).
Theorem 12. U is the unique U-monotone mechanism.
Proof. Suppose  is any U -monotone mechanism but that it is diQerent
from the university-optimal mechanism,  = U . Then there must exist a problem
(; q) with (; q) = U (; q), say (v) = U (v) for some v∈U , so l((v)) ¡v
l(U (v))= b.
Consider (−v; q), identical to (; q) except that university v becomes the least ac-
ceptable university on the list of every applicant a who is ranked below b by university
v. (; q) is an improved problem for v over (−v; q).
U is clearly stable in (−v; q). Claim: if  is any stable assignment in (−v; q)
then b′= l((v))¿vb. For suppose otherwise, namely, b′ ¡v b for some stable . b′
must be assigned in U too and by the de=nition of −v, U (b′) ¡b′ (b′)= v, but
this contradicts the opposition of interests between U and A (Theorem 4).
Let −v def= (−v; q). Since −v is stable, l(−v(v))¿vb, but l((v)) ¡v b. This
contradicts the U -monotonicity of  if  =−v; otherwise it contradicts the fact that
 produces a unique stable outcome.
5.4. Strategy-proofness
Suppose (; q) represents the true preferences of all the players and that (′; q) does
also, except for a subset of the universities U ′ who announce altered preferences. The
mechanism  is said to be strategy-proof for universities if (′; q)¿u(; q) for
all u∈U ′ is false, for every choice of U ′⊂U . A mechanism is strategy-proof in this
de=nition if no subset of the universities can all improve their classes by stating false
preferences.
Lemma 12. The mechanism U is strategy-proof for universities.
Proof. The proof exactly parallels that of Lemma 9.
The example of Fig. 11 shows that it is not possible to improve this result. For
suppose the universities all cheated, each dropping from consideration those applicants
that belong to U\. Then  becomes the university-optimal assignment in this new
problem; it is “better” than U with responsive preferences, but not with the natural
preferences as de=ned in this paper.
Theorem 13. U is the unique strategy-proof mechanism for universities.
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Proof. The proof is again a near replica of the proof of the corresponding result
for the applicant-optimal mechanism. The only modi=cation is in the construction of
(′; q): all nodes are excluded that precede (u; l(U (u))) in its row for each u∈U for
which (u) ≺u U (u), where  is the strategy-proof mechanism for universities that
is assumed to be diQerent from U .
Again, each of three criteria uniquely determine the mechanism U . However, in the
contexts of the French and Turkish problems, the criteria are not pertinent. In Turkey,
the students determine the problem entirely: their examination scores determine their
university rankings, they themselves determine their individual preferences. In France,
once the universities announce their rankings, the candidates for positions become
the sole strategic agents, so they collectively control the outcome via the individual
preferences that each decides to declare. There is no symmetry between candidates and
universities in these practical instances.
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